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Pudore: 
The Theory and 
Practice of Modesty 
Rebecca West 
Review-essay on Alessandro Dal Lago and Pier Aldo Rovatti, 
eds., £logia de[ pudare. Per un pensiera debate. Milano: Feltrinelli, 
1990. 
1. Rovatti was the co-editor, with Gianni Vattimo, of the 1983 
collection entitled II pensiera debale. Born in 1942, he teaches the 
history of contemporary philosophy in Trieste and directs the 
review Aut Aut. Rovatti has published studies in the areas of phe-
nomenology, cultural criticism, and political and psychoanalytical 
thought. His most recent titles include La pasta i11 giaca. Heidegger, 
Husserl, ii saggetta (Milano 1987) and IL declina della Luce (Genova 
1988). Dal Lago, born in 1947, teaches political science at the 
University of Milan. He contributed an essay to the volume IL 
pensiera debole entitled "L' etica della debolezza. Simone Weil e il 
nichilismo." He has edited various works of Hannah Arendt, and 
among his most recent titles are IL paliteismo madema (Milano 
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1989) and II parndosso dell'agirc (Napoli 1990). 
The volume Elogio def pudore consists of a first seclion by 
Rovatti in which he writes an excursus called "Effetti del pensiero 
dcbole," followed by a chapter entitled "Elogio del pudore." The 
second section, by Dal Lago, includes his excursus, "La tentazione 
dclla forza," and a chapter dedicated to Heidegger, "La politica 
dcl filosofo. Heidegger e noi." The "Appendicc," which in fact 
takes up more than half the volume, is made up of five previously 
published essays, three by Rovatti and two by Dal Lago. Both 
Rovatti and Dal Lago summarize and respond to various reac-
tions to and critiques of "pensiero debole" in their first chapters. 
Rovatti then moves on to an elaboration of the concept of 
"pudore" in relation primarily to the issue of the subject, while 
Dal Lago undertakes to do a "weak" reading of Heidegger's 1933 
discourse Die Sclbstbehaupt1111g der deutsche11 Universitat, which 
inaugurated his assumption of the rectorship of the University of 
Frciburg. All of the essays, to one degree or another, attempt to 
deal with the ethics of philosophizing, both from the point of 
view of the contemporary transformation of philosophical lan-
guage and from that of the relation of philosophy to other dis-
courses, be they literary, political, or private. 
Rovatti opens "Effetti del pcnsiero debole" by writing of the 
many effects the proposal of "weak thought" has created since the 
appearance of the eponymous volume in 1983. Well beyond the 
immediate philosophical context, the word "debole" has been 
taken up by various specialists and non-specialists alike to cap-
ture what Rovatti terms "una risonanza semantica ... leJ un 
bisogno" (9). Seeking some way of approaching the great and 
abiding questions concerning truth, the representability of experi-
ence, the individual's identity, and so on, while recognizing the 
limits of a purely analytical and/ or rational approach-an unself-
consciously "strong" approach, in short-many welcomed the 
proposition of a "weak thought," while many others saw it as a 
direct threat not only to the traditional strengths of philosophy 
but to thought itself. Rovatti notes that while the 1983 volume's 
overall tone was "poetica, sperimentale, aperta, per sua natura 
non inglobante," the negative reactions were disproportionately 
"definitorie, generalizzanti, rapidamente liquidatorie" (10). 
However, Rovatti recognizes the necessity now of going beyond 
the experimental and generally open proposition of "debolezza" 
advanced by the 1983 collection if "weak thought" is going to be 
anything more than an already consumed or used-up metaphor 
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for a variety of concerns and attitudes. 
Before positing a way of doing so, he returns to the negative 
critiques advanced against it, primarily the arguments of C. A. 
Viano in his book Va' pensiero. Debolezza e indeterminazione nel 
"Pensiero debole" (Einaudi, 1985). Anyone who has read Viano's 
book knows how sharp, ironic, and ultimately dismissive his cri-
tique of weak thought is. Redubbing the representatives of 
"debolezza" as "i flebili," he writes that the culture they are sug-
gesting is "consolatoria," "una macchina apologetica," and that 
their proposition is nothing more than a "moda" which repropos-
es "vecchie masserizie." Rovatti succinctly sums up Viano's cri-
tique: "Ma qual' e il punto? 'Manca la teoria'" (12). The essays in 
the 1983 collection refuse theory in favor of hermeneutics, etymo-
logical speculations, dialectics and difference, and literary digres-
sions. These are not "conoscenza," according to Viano, even if 
they can be called "pensiero." And clearly philosophy's task is in 
the realm of knowledge and not mere thought. 
There followed a debate, on the pages of La Stampa, between 
Viano and Vattimo. Rovatti also later attempted a reply to Viano's 
criticism in a piece published in La Repubblica on December 16, 
1985, entitled "Seil filosofo ha paura." In it he makes two points 
to which he returns in the present chapter: one, that the term 
"pensiero debole" was and is "una metafora infelice" in the sense 
in which all metaphors are unfortunate and failed, that is, are 
attempts at completely and fully describing something while hav-
ing already recognized the impossibility of doing so. Second, he 
asserts that negative critiques of weak thought are motivated pri -
marily by fear of the loss of philosophy's standing and of the 
philosopher's privileged relationship to language. To assert that 
weak thought is dismissible because it is "only literature" is to 
imply, of course, that there is writing which is absolutely distin-
guishable from literature; that, in other words, philosophy is 
somehow beyond and safe from the "dangers" of polysemy, 
metaphorical modes of thought and expression, and temporality. 
To suggest that such is not the case is certainly to deny philoso-
phy's exclusive and privileged relationship to truth and to lan-
guage through which it is expressed. 
Rovatti's point is precisely this, and he makes it in reference 
to another negative critique of "weak thought": that of Massimo 
Cacciari who, in an interview published in the Corriere del Ticino 
on June 11, 1988, said that the success of weak thought 
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quella certa vague post-heideggeriana che ha avuto successo 
soprattutto presso i discepoli di Derrida in Francia e poi si e dif-
fusa anche in Italia e negli Stati Uniti, ... non sia dovuto ad altro 
che alla sua natura di mera Ietteratura. 11 pensiero debole e Ietter-
atura, una letteratura che porta ad espressione quella che e ormai 
l'idea guida de! nostro senso comune, la convinzione che ii 
molteplice, il frammento, sia qualcosa che in quanto tale possa 
contestare e decostruire la totalita. (15) 
Rovatti sees in this a reappearance of "l'antica paura che la purez-
za della teoria, che il filosofo dovrebbe sorvegliare, possa subire la 
contaminazione di un discorso esterno e secondario" (15). If, as 
Cacciari suggests, literature is the realm of common sense regard-
ing the multiple and the fragmentary, then philosophy is perforce 
something else-or it too becomes "mere literature." Rovatti 
argues that weak thought introduces the notion that philosophy is 
also (and must be) the realm of the multiple, the fragmentary, and 
above all the "non dicibile" which is "il nostro qui ed ora" (16). In 
so doing, he once more challenges the presuppositions of philo-
sophical language's privileged access to truth, and the philoso-
pher's privileged subjectivity which permits him or her total 
objectivity and consistency. 
Here we are, then, poised once again over the abyss of resig -
nation; contemplating the "non dicibile," must we then be 
resigned to being nothing more than mourners? Rovatti's answer 
is that we have other options, for he asserts that a recognition of 
the loss of a "padronanza dell'io" need not lead to a purely con-
templative reiteration of what we can no longer do. As he puts it, 
"disinvestimento" in the concept of "un io forte" is not the same 
thing as "de-responsabilizzazione," nor, I would think his argu-
ment implies, does rejection of the concept of foundational truths 
expressible in privileged discourse mean that all that is left are 
assertions of the futility of thought and the radical limits of lan-
guage. This would indeed be a resigned and nostalgic attitude 
without any ethical potential or force. 
So we arrive to the question: How to proceed? What indeed 
can the mode of thought called "weak" do once it has pointed out 
the limitations of traditional metaphysical discourse, once it has 
argued the unprivileged nature both of philosophical language 
and of the philosophizing subject? Rovatti writes that weak 
thought and the resultant "pudore del linguaggio" are, like all 
metaphors, "un abbassamento di voce, un silenzio nel linguaggio 
e nel pensiero: il tentativo di sbloccare una pienezza" (20). Weak 
thought is not yet another salvific proposal nor is it a project 
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which seeks ultimately to transcend its own limits by offering sys-
tematized and systematizing substitutions for other past failed 
projects. It seeks to remain in the realm of risk, contradiction, and 
conflict: 
Dunque l' esercizio del pudore, che qui indichiamo come la chiave 
del pensiero debole, e il tentativo di abitare una condizione di con-
flitto con noi stessi. E allora il pensiero debole potrebbe essere il 
tentativo di 'dire'questa condizione nella sua paradossalita. (22) 
The "pudore" of which Rovatti speaks does not permit us to 
remove ourselves from our shared "dimora" which, in order to be 
"abitabile" must be "pensabile," but which cannot, through 
human thought of any sort, be brought into line or dominated by 
pretenses to ultimate truth or truths that resolve the dilemmas of 
existence. 
In the second chapter, "Elogio del pudore," Rovatti further 
elaborates the concepts of "weakening" and "modesty" as an 
ethics of philosophizing. With recourse to Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, 
Ricoeur, Heidegger, Vattimo, and others, Rovatti explores the 
issue of a weakened subjectivity as fundamental to his view of 
pensiero debole's task. If knowledge is not going to be a continu-
al search for domination and overcoming, it can perhaps become 
thought's goal to inhabit ("abitare"), modestly and poetically, the 
paradoxical dilemmas of self and the world. Using the metaphors 
of "full" and "empty," and of "illumination" and "shadow" 
(which are connected to the unconscious), Rovatti proposes that 
the latter terms, more traditionally imbued with negativity, are in 
fact endowed with positive representational power in that empty 
zones and shadowy realms (such as dreams) permit us to escape 
from the tyranny of a belief in domination over ourselves and 
over the world and our experiences of it. As we recognize that 
the "non dicibile" is our "dimora," and that we are exiled not only 
from a full grasp of experience and of its expression but, more 
importantly, from our own selves (difference and alterity, that is, 
reside within each of us and not only within others), we institute 
a different rapport with thought, language, and actions. Listening 
becomes more important than seeing; "pudore" (and I under-
stand it both as "shame" and "modesty") becomes an inevitable 
attribute; and the hie et nunc in which we find ourselves-the 
space and time of our being and of our thought-are endowed 
with their full validity, in contrast to monolithic, transcendental, 
and privileged concepts either of the consistent subject or of 
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thought itself. I'll quote Rovatti's concluding words, which sum 
up his proposal of modesty (which is also a modest proposal): 
II non padroneggiamento, la caduta della pretesa, comportano uno 
scarto ironico .. . II ritrarsi, che intacca la padronanza del sapere e 
in primo luogo del sapere del soggetto su se stesso, o che 
comunque ci permette per un momento di guardare le cose sotto 
un' altra luce, e al tempo stesso un affidarsi a una zona mobile e ris-
chiosa. II carattere fittizio e ironico della metafora esprime questa 
instabilita ... un ulteriore cautela: quella di non far diventare 
'seria' e stabil e una condizione che assomiglia piuttosto a un 
momento (mai fissabile) di squilibrio. (47) 
Thus we are reminded that weak thought is not itself exempt 
from the instability and internal erosions which it explores. 
Moving to Dal Lago' s "La tentazione della forza," we listen 
to a very different voice. Although he and Rovatti clearly share 
many similar preoccupations and perspectives, Dal Lago's 
emphases are other. The excursus is a spirited and at times rather 
acerbic response to the critics of weak thought. He suggests that 
had the title of the by now infamous 1983 volume been something 
more anodyne and conventional like "Saggi sul postmoderno," 
"Filosofia e letteratura," or "Crisi del sapere e filosofia," the book 
would probably have received a no more negative or sarcastic 
reception than many others. But it broke the rules and went 
against convention by daring to assert that philosophical thought 
could have something to do with weakness-that philosophy, in 
short, can be and is in fact made up of something which is not 
only strong thinking ("idee forti") (53). Dal Lago then individu-
ates two areas put into question by weak thought; first, "la forma 
del discorso filosofico" and next, "il ruolo della professione 
filosofica." It is well recognized that philosophy is having a hard 
time living up to the scientific model it has often emulated and 
that it has long since lost a certain kind of unassailable legitimacy. 
But Dal Lago writes that it is time to say openly that all sorts of 
heterogeneous activities now go under the name of philosophy: 
historiography, philology, political science, interpretation of a 
wide variety of texts the choice and importance of which depend 
on which philosophical tradition the culture in question happens 
most strongly to validate. Certainly there is also theorizing, what 
Dal Lago calls "il lavoro della filosofia sulle proprie verita eterne e 
atemporali: il soggetto, la ragione, il divenire, le forme del pen-
sare, la verita stessa." But here we find "le scissioni piu radicali, i 
conflitti piu insanabili" and here is where weak thought has 
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found its severest critics as well as some measure of comprehen -
sion. For here is where "la filosofia gioca la sua partita eterna, che 
e quella della verita, della propria verita, e quindi della propria 
legittimita" (all quotations on 56). Now, regarding the form or 
forms of philosophical discourse, Dal Lago writes that weak 
thought has been so severely criticized by some not because of its 
practitioners' interest in literature and art (which, after all, 
philosophers of aesthetics at least have always been permitted), 
but because it "contaminates" the "scientific" language of philos-
ophy with literary language. He continues: 
Se dovessi definire cos'e per me il pensiero debole, parlerei di una 
pratica paradossalmente morale: divenire cio che si e, accettare la 
marginalita della filosofia non solo rispetto al mondo, ma soprat-
tutto rispetto ai propri miti fondativi. Miti che non sono difficile 
rintracciare ... verita, forza, purezza metodologica, profondita. 
superiorita, e simili. In questo senso, rinunciando all' esibizione 
della propria poten za immaginaria, si puo parlare di pudore in 
filosofia." (60) 
As for the role of the profession of philosophy, Dal Lago 's 
view is that philosophers do not have a large role (or at any rat e a 
privileged one) in the various civil and political, as well as gener-
ally intellectual, debates carried on in today's societies. He does 
not lament this fact, nor is he suggesting that there should be a 
return to the times when philosophers had a special aura; he 
wishes simply that it be seen as a fact. He concludes: 
Nel suo accettare le contaminazioni-in primo luogo il senso che 
puo provenire da altri linguaggi, poetici e letterari ma non solo-il 
pensiero debole minaccia le pretese [di una purezza intrinseca alla 
filosofia]; sia quelle che provengono da un certo moralismo scien-
tista or storicista, sia quelle che si manifestano in un certo tono ora-
colare in filosofia, compreso anche-non c'e bisogno di 
dirlo-quello di Heidegger, quando e il caso. Come si vede, minac-
ciare il primato delle forme ha anche degli effetti di sostanza. (58) 
In the chapter on Heidegger, Dal Lago analyzes the dis-
course read by Heidegger in 1933 upon assuming the rectorship 
of the University of Freiburg. (Dal Lago primarily uses the Italian 
translation, L'autoaffermazione dell'universita tedesca, but provides 
his own versions of the original when necessary to his argument.) 
Dal Lago's thesis, in extremely condensed form, is that the dis-
course, strangely ignored by specialists of Heidegger, is an 
"indubbia espressione filosofica" and should be approached as 
such, and not only as an expression of "una scelta politica des-
olante" (61). Dal Lago's main point is that the discourse implicit-
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ly proposes and furthers a "pretesa di potenza" for philosophy 
itself and for the philosopher as educator not only of the people 
but also of political leaders - a sort of "capo dei capi" or Platonic 
"philosopher-king." This attitude is not, according to Dal Lago, 
merely the result of Heidegger's personal megalomania, but 
rather indicates once again the "qualcosa di perennemente ecces-
sivo nella filosofia ... la pretesa di dire la verita ultima ... pretesa 
di fondazioni trans-storiche, di parole dette una volta e echeg-
gianti senza fine nel mondo." (103) The concept of "pudore" 
seeks to counter this pretense, not only as it is revealed in 
Heidegger, but also as it is manifested in those of his critics who 
confuse "il balbettio del filosofo nel mondo" with "l' essenza del 
totalitarismo" (103). 
2. Following Peter Carravetta's lead, a few scholars working in 
the American academy have begun to pay serious attention to 
weak thought. The intellectual and ethical seriousness and rele-
vance they perceive in this area of work are no more evident than 
in their thoughtful critiques of it. (We do not, after all, criticize 
what we do not value.) In Maurizio Viano's essay, "Sesso debole, 
pensiero debole," published in the 1989 Annali d'Italianistica vol-
ume dedicated to women's voices in Italian literature, he brings 
feminism and weak thought together in such a way as to high-
light some of the inherently flawed aspects of the latter. If, as the 
"debolisti" insist, both the subject and language are not transcen-
dental entities but rather are tied to temporality, flux, contradic-
tion, and the local, then surely they are also gendered and sexed 
entities . But gender is never discussed as a conditioning factor of 
thought in the work of the "debolisti," nor are the "weakened" 
perspectives proposed and advanced by feminist critiques of 
dominant culture and discourse recognized. Viano can argue his 
own case much better than I, and I therefore urge that his essay be 
read in its entirety. My point here is that this "blind spot" 
remains in the volume I have discussed, and deserves to be fur -
ther questioned. Rovatti proposes that "debolezza" is a metaphor 
that reflects a "risonanza semantica e un bisogno" in many differ-
ent arenas of current critical and theoretical production. But if we 
think for a moment about the "semantic resonance" of the new 
term being advanced-pudore-we cannot help thinking about its 
etymological sense and its semantic field, both of which pertain to 
gender and to the sexual sphere. 
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The Dizionario italiano ragionato gives us the following infor-
mation regarding the word "pudore": 
latino: pudor, pudoris; dal verbo pudere: "vergognarsi." 
Nell'accettazione piu legata all'etimologia: Que! ritegno che trat-
tiene del mostrare pubblicamente le parti intime del corpo o parti 
pudende (di cui si deve avere vergogna). Tuttavia i dizionari con-
temporanei presentano imbarazzanti diversita; vi si pub infatti 
leggere che il pudore e "un sentimento di riserbo e di vergogna nei 
confronti di tutto quanta riguarda la sfera sessuale", ma anche che 
il pudore e "un senso di avversione e difesa nei confronti degli 
aspetti equivoci e morbosi del sesso". Forse oggi potremmo dire: 
"il naturale senso di ritegno per quanto riguarda sia l'intimita fisica 
sia l'intimita spirituale della propria persona e della altrui. 
The related term "pudicizia" is defined as "discrezione nel parlare 
e nell' agire, in particolare riferita al sesso." 
Of course, Rovatti and Dal Lago are using the term 
"pudore" in ways distant from its etymology. Nonetheless, their 
own aversion to an explicit acknowledgment of the gendered 
nature of the subject can perhaps be seen as etymologically "pudi -
co." It is a commonly shared reaction that "pudore" is a term 
most often applied to women in everyday speech, as well as a 
fundamental concept at the basis of many elaborations of Freud 
regarding female sexual development and behavior. In choosing 
this particular term, Rovatti and Dal Lago cannot have been deaf 
to such resonances. I am not out to "get" the proponents of weak 
thought and philosophical modesty, both of which are to my 
mind welcome and potentially positive propositions. Yet the 
problematic and disturbing silence of these thinkers around the 
issue of the sexual and gendered aspects not only of the fractured 
subject of which they so consistently speak, but of systems of 
thought and presuppositions of language that have dominated 
and continue to dominate their own culture is, I think, worthy of 
further note. If they themselves wish to admit various "contami-
nations"-poetic, literary, and so on-into philosophical dis-
course, will the resultant "abbassamento di voce" nonetheless 
affect a paradoxically disembodied yet distinctly and exclusively 
male voice? There are good silences and bad silences; if we are 
silent because we aim to be so, then perhaps we are indeed 
involved in "unblocking a fullness." If, however, we are silent 
because we have no voice, or rather, a voice unheard and ignored, 
then we remain in the realm of imposed lack rather than potential 
fullness. The heterogeneity of "pensiero debole" and of its advo-
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cates-as Rovatti put it, its "poetic, experimental, open, and 
unsystematized" nature-appears to welcome the participation of 
widely diverse discourses and practices. Can the difference that 
has been and continues to be biologically, culturally, politically, 
and socially defined between the male and female remain a moot 
subject for philosophy, especially for a "filosofia pudica"? It has 
not remained so for literature, for literary and cultural criticism, 
for history, for law, for politics. 
Another stimulating critique of weak thought has recently been 
elaborated by Edmund Jacobitti in his "On the Wisdom of the 
Most Recent Italians or How Italian is Weak Thought?" which 
was read at the 1989 Purdue University Conference on Romance 
Languages, Literatures and Film and published in the confer-
ence's journal, Romance Languages Annual (Vol. I, 1989). Jacobitti's 
critique is quite different from Viano's; his interest is in the 
debolisti's general avoidance of any reference to the specifically 
Italian philosophical tradition with its long-standing civic and 
practical emphases. In this he finds a paradox, for weak thought 
appears to argue for precisely a more practical "doing-in-the-
world" approach to philosophical work. He writes: 
There is in weak thought a shift of interest and emphasis away 
from the Civitas Dei and onto the world of practice; a general recog-
nition of immanence as opposed to transcendence, of the need to 
forget abstract theories and systems and to get down to practical 
hard work. (144) 
Jacobi tti's critique-that debolisti appear to have forgotten their 
own Ciceronian -Machiavellian traditions of "doing in this 
world" -points out that, in spite of their claims to wish to concen-
trate on immanence, their concerns remain nonetheless "oddly, 
wholly metaphysical" (145). He writes that they claim to be prag-
matic, in short, but remain on the level of abstraction and devote 
almost exclusive attention to the deconstruction of any and all 
foundational modes of thinking. By working primarily out of a 
non -Italian philosophical tradition, weak thought, according to 
Jacobitti's perspective, may indeed not be very Italian at all-and 
this to its detriment. 
I cannot summarize Jacobitti's entire argument, but do 
urge that it, like Maurizio Viano's critique, be read for the very 
va luable perspectives it brings to some of the limitations and 
flaws of the debolisti's project, at least as far as it has manifested 
itself up to now. 
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In my final few words I would like to turn to a brief consid-
eration of the usefulness of the concepts of weakness and mod-
esty for the critical, creative, and pedagogical tasks in which we 
are all to one degree or another involved. If weak thought is 
indeed a metaphor and responds to a generalized need in many 
areas of thought and action, it would appear appropriate that, fol-
lowing the debolisti's lead, we make use of their propositions in 
our areas of interest-literature, pedagogy-just as they incorpo-
rate literary preoccupations into philosophical discourse and 
practice. In fact, I would like to see more of an explicitly open 
exchange in both directions. Many of us have moved toward 
weak thought and its advocates in the role either of supporters or 
detractors, but all as disseminators. It would be good to see the 
debolisti move beyond what is still primarily the world inhabited 
by professional philosophers, toward the worlds lived in by writ-
ers, literary critics and theoreticians, and teachers of other related 
disciplines. They "contaminate" their discourses with those of lit-
erature, psychoanalysis, and all sorts of areas and methodologies, 
of course; but I am speaking of a different sort of opening out, 
that would bring the living voices of non-philosophers into their 
activities, and would curtail a bit the tendency to elitism that 
quite clearly mars their stance. How many more readings of 
Heidegger can we-or they-find useful to being (with a small 
"b")? Would pondering together the not inconsiderable problem 
of how and what we teach, of the validity of academic institutions 
of all sorts, and of the domination of our Western academies by 
what is still preponderantly strong thought and practices be any 
less valid a way of divesting in concepts of the "io forte" and of 
strong thought than re-reading certain modern masters of the 
philosophical tradition for yet another time? This may be an 
unfair criticism of the weak thinkers, for they turn attention quite 
naturally to texts and issues most closely associated to their own 
immediate areas of professional concern, as do we all. But if you 
are advocating a general shift in perspective and "contaminating " 
your discipline with the language and views of others, are you 
not implicitly advocating as well real changes in academic prac-
tices that affect both present and future thinkers of whatever ilk? 
To end on an openly personal note, I want to give voice to 
my own sense of how I would like to incorporate the perspectives 
of "weakness" and "modesty" into my own practices as an 
American woman academic. I have long been interested in what 
might metaphorically be called the "muted" qualities of certain 
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writers and of certain poetics and practices. Yet I am also aware 
that my profession is a declarative one; both criticism and teach -
ing have traditionally relied on an assertive style, a mastery of a 
body of material, and a hierarchy not only of judgments but of 
institutional practices by which the academy functions. Weak 
thought first captured my attention precisely for its "semantic res-
onance"; how good to read of a project openly situated in the 
"muted" realm of weakness as opposed to the "declarative" king-
dom of strength! As I read more, however, my initially enthusias-
tic response has itself been muted somewhat. I've alluded to 
some aspects of weak thought - the fundamental lack of attention 
to the gendered nature of experience; the essential avoidance of 
issues pertaining to "doing in the world," the elitism-that dis -
turb me and many of my colleagues also working in our shared 
context of the American academy. But it is not only these lacks 
that create a certain diffidence in me. It is the failure, at least so 
far, to explore the very concrete ethical, social, personal, and espe-
cially pedagogical implications of "debolezza." Our professional 
discourses have changed radically in the last twenty years or so, 
but I fear that the changes affect us locally as professional aca-
demics much more than our students or, beyond academe, our 
contributions to wider societal and deeper personal ethics. Weak 
thought remains firmly and squarely within traditional academic 
boundaries; debolisti write and speak to and for each other and/ or 
against professional fortisti. I do not believe that the professional 
academic's role is or even can be primarily social and political. 
We remain in the abstract realm of theory and the intensely spe-
cialized discourses of our own preoccupations whether we do so 
"weakly" or "strongly." But we do have an important pedagogical 
function and, for those of us who teach literature, we certainly 
recognize that literature itself still has an ethical and pedagogical 
value no doubt far beyond its intent. I myself have felt in recent 
years a need to return to literature; that is, to escape at least some-
what the critical and theoretical mazes in which our profession 
wanders, and to encounter the creations of writers, if not "inno -
cently" and "directly," at least non -aggressively. Whatever we 
may have to teach our students, and however we may wish to 
employ critical methodologies, I think that we can agree that the 
human capacity to create, through words as through paint, stone, 
or chords, is worthy of at least as much respect as the human 
capacity to elaborate theories or to critique systems and struc -
tures. My own view may be seen as "nostalgic," "humanistic," 
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even "belle-lettristic," but it is my goal to help my students to 
experience the richness and positivity of literature in its function 
as a mode of creativity and a way of organizing the infinite prolif-
eration that is experience, rather than only or primarily as fodder 
for professional criticism and theory. I wish to weaken and mute 
my own role as a critic and theorist of literature, and to concen-
trate more on my role as a reader and writer among many others, 
not because I think that the critic's and theorist's is an irrelevant 
or necessarily falsely privileged role, but because I want to take 
the lessons of weakness, non-aggressivity, and modesty seriously, 
therefore turning more attention to the creative and the pedagogi-
cal and to whatever literature and teaching (as contrasted to criti-
cism and theory) might be or become. 
I also want to continue to encourage others to think about 
ways of breaking out of some of the straitjackets of the academy's 
traditional practices as they affect our and our students' daily 
lives. The paradox is, of course, that this can appear to be a call 
for the transformation of our academic practices and institutional 
structures, and thus a call to "strong" action, yet another "projec-
tual" vision like so many that have come before us. Perhaps it is, 
and perhaps any "putting into action" of convictions, perspec-
tives, and thought is inevitably "strong." But we cannot avoid rec-
ognizing that within academics "we" are "they"; we create the 
rules of the game-the game itself, in fact- within our own uni-
versities and colleges, and within our own broader practices such 
as publications, conventions, debates, promotions, and the like. 
Can those of us who believe that all too often the best is marginal-
ized, while the worst nakedly ("spudoratamente") struts about, 
modestly state that this is the case, much as the child who refused 
to be awed by the emperor's non-existent new clothes? Can we 
not only state it, but act on it in the contexts of our classrooms, 
our departments, our institutions? The feudally baronial mentali-
ty that continues to dominate Italian academic practices, for 
example, need a good dose of "pudore," as do many of our own 
attitudes and ways of doing on this side of the ocean. It seems to 
me that words like "foster," "nurture," "collaborate," and 
"respect" are too often written out of our theories and practices in 
favor of terms and acts of aggression, appropriation, domination, 
and the like. I am searching, like many others, for modes of 
being and doing that permit what I see as the positive potential of 
weakening and modesty to function as an ethics at once personal, 
professional, pedagogical, and social. If we and others involved 
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in our enterprises who are part of this search-and I know there 
are many - have the strength to be weak, we may find that living 
out this paradoxical contradiction may have a modest value. And 
that might be enough to navigate through the fragmented, foun-
dationless world with some sense of direction, even though the 
final destination must remain unknown. 
